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The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia Comes of Age: Some Observations on 
Day-To-Day Dilemmas of an International Court 
Patricia M. Wald∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 In late 1999 I left the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit to become the U.S. Judge on the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY or Tribunal).  
For me, this year has been a fascinating, difficult, sometimes 
frustrating, and mostly rewarding experience. The ICTY was created 
by United Nations Security Council Resolution in 1993 to prosecute 
and adjudicate war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia on or after 
January, 1991. That includes all aspects of the Bosnian conflict as 
well as the more recent Kosovo war. The Tribunal exercises personal 
jurisdiction over persons indicted for the categories of war crimes set 
out in the ICTY Statute,1 wherever apprehended; no extradition 
proceedings are necessary. It can impose sentences up to life 
imprisonment, but not death.2 The Tribunal is a temporary court in 
the sense that its mission is geographically and temporally limited. It 
is not expected to finish its work for at least another decade.3 In the 
 
 ∗  Judge, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia; Judge, U.S. Court 
of Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit, 1979-1999; Chief Judge, 1986-91; L.L.B. Yale 
Law School, 1951. 
 1. U.N. SCOR 48th Sess., 3217th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res 827 (1993); ICTY STATUTE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL art. 1, available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/ 
statute.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2001) [hereinafter ICTY STAT.]. 
 2. ICTY STAT., supra note 1, art. 23. 
 3. Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and 
Functioning of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc A/54/634, at 18-19 (1999) [hereinafter 
Expert Group Report]. 
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first few years the Tribunal tried very few cases, defendants had been 
indicted but few apprehended. Now SFOR, the NATO Peacekeeping 
force, is arresting indictees at the rate of one a month and we are 
overwhelmed in our Trial Chambers. The UN has agreed to supply us 
with ad litem judges (designated for particular cases only) to cut 
down our backlog.4 There are sixteen members of the court elected 
by the General Assembly with no more than one from a single 
country; nine assigned to three Chambers of three trial judges each 
and seven to an Appeals Chamber.5 The Tribunal makes its own rules 
of procedure in plenary session and is governed by a president and 
vice-president elected by its members. The Tribunal has three organs: 
the Chambers, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), and the Registry 
which administers services to the court and provides for protection of 
witnesses and detention of the accused. We sit in the Hague in the 
Netherlands in austere quarters, no one would mistake our renovated 
insurance building for the Peace Palace of the International Court 
of Justice. The ICTY in seven years has grown from a dozen or so 
employees to over one thousand and has a budget of almost a $100 
million.6 There is a companion court, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), created to adjudicate criminal cases 
arising from the 1994 genocide in that country. Appeals from the 
ICTR are heard by the common Appeals Chamber of our Tribunal. 
Both courts are considered precursors for the forthcoming 
International Criminal Court (ICC), which will be treaty-based and 
permanentand which the United States has not yet ratified. 
Those are the bare-bone statistics. Inside our courtrooms the 
darkest and most brutal tales are told of mans inhumanity to man and 
woman, including genocide and crimes against humanity involving 
thousands of victims, systematic rapes of women and girls, prolonged 
detention under the most barbaric of conditions, merciless beatings, 
and callous destruction of homes and villages. Only a small number 
of the perpetrators can be brought to trial. The rest remain at large, 
 
 4.  Judge Claude Jorda, ICTY, Speech to Security Council 6 (June 21,  2000) (on file 
with author). 
 5.  ICTY STAT., supra note 1, arts. 12-13. 
 6.  ICTY, ICTY Key figures, at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/keyfig-e.htm (last visited 
March, 2001). 
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intensifying the perception in some quarters that we are a political 
tool of the Western nations, and in others quarters that we are a 
marginal operation because we have been unable to get jurisdiction 
over the so-called big fishSlobodan Milosevic, Radovan Karadzic, 
and Ratko Mladicwho are thought to have masterminded the worst 
crimes. 
The ICTY is a bold experiment. It tracks to some degree the 
earlier Nuremberg and Tokyo World War II war crime trials but it 
goes far beyond those precedents in important ways. It is performing 
three functions: adjudicating international crimes, developing 
international humanitarian law, and memorializing important, albeit 
horrible, events of modern history. Except for Nuremberg and Tokyo 
and subsequent isolated war crimes prosecutions in national courts of 
figures such as Adolph Eichmann and Klaus Barbie, the Tribunal has 
very little caselaw to rely upon. Its procedures are a hybrid of 
common law and continental practice and its judges speak a dozen 
native languages more fluently than the official French and English 
of the Tribunal.  
Among international scholars the Tribunal has attracted 
widespread attention. It is reportedly more written about in the 
international journals than any other topic. I will not trace the legal 
developments at the Tribunal, which are already widely covered by 
scholars and commentators, or recount the heartbreaking stories of 
the horrors inflicted on citizens of a fairly modern central European 
countryindeed, one that had hosted the 1984 Olympicsin the last 
years of the twentieth century. Rather because I believe we will see 
many more international courtstemporary or permanentin the years 
to come, I want to share my impressions of the way these newbreed 
courts work, what problems beset our day-to-day functioning, and 
how we try to resolve those problemsall comprising the 
monumental task of making the Tribunal work in the way that will 
further justice and maybe even deter future reigns of terror both in 
war and in peace. 
II. THE JUDGES 
Judges on international courts come from different legal systems. 
A roughcut can be made between the Anglo-American common law 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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system and the continental civil law system. As far as criminal law is 
concerned, the common law system relies on the parties to make their 
case with the judge or jury as umpire and is characterized by detailed 
rules governing the admissibility of evidence in court and what the 
parties can expect from one another before and during trial. On the 
other hand, the civil law system uses an investigating judge to 
supervise the compilation of a dossier, that can include more wide-
ranging evidence than permitted at common law, to which the 
defendant responds at trial. The judge actively controls the direction 
of the trial and often directs the questioning.7 
The ICTY employs a sometimes uneasy and frequently awkward 
blend of the two systems. Even though the ICTY has over 100 Rules8 
setting out the ingredients of a mix which initially tilted in favor of 
the common law adversarial trial, invariably interstitial questions 
arise in response to which judges from different systems will tend to 
apply what comes naturally. For instance, civil law judges may 
question witnesses much more freely than in our system. However, I 
have noticed that such questioning may throw off the rhythm of the 
prosecutions or the defenses case presented in an adversarial mode, 
casting the judge in the role of an uninvited guest at the party. The 
prosecution or the defense may have a carefully selected series of 
witnesses, called in sequence to build on each others testimony and 
with knowledge of just how far to take each witness in questioning. 
The other side, for its own strategic reasons, may have no desire to 
press that witness further, but then when the judge steps in and asks 
the ultimate blunt conclusionary questions the prosecution (or the 
defense) have been slowly and painstakingly working toward, the 
lawyer that presented the witness must scramble to get back control 
of the case. Additionally, judges dont always repeat the witnesss 
testimony precisely when they ask a follow-up question (or, not 
infrequently, it may be garbled in translation), thereby risking an 
answer based on an erroneous premise. Counsel are understandably 
hesitant to correct the judge and, candidly, the judges do not always 
welcome such interruptions. When a civil law judge asks questions 
he has the benefit of an ongoing familiarity with the dossier compiled 
 
 7.  GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 179-83 (1994).  
 8.  ICTY R.P. & EVID. (2000). 
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in the case.9 It is my opinion that civil judges tend to feel more 
comfortable in letting evidence into the case that might be banned in 
a common law trial on the theory that the judge can sort out the 
reliable from the unreliable. Common law judges are used to 
operating under restraints imposed at the threshold as to what kind of 
evidence is admissible. Differences of opinions on admissibility arise 
often in ICTY trials among judges on the same panel and among 
different Chambers. There are numerous other areas where differing 
practices from the two systems clash: the legitimacy of leading 
questions; whether notes used by a witness must be divulged to the 
opposite party; and whether in-court identification of the accused 
should be allowed. The lack of a common legal culture tends to 
produce frequent, small irritations and tensions throughout the trials. 
There are nine ICTY trial judges who sit in panels of three, 
usually five days a week for four to seven hours a day. Trials have 
lasted between two weeks and two years,10 with one of the judges, 
usually the senior judge on the panel, acting as presiding officer. This 
regime produces problems when one judge is absent for sickness or 
urgent personal matters. The Rules are quite rigid. A judge may not 
be absent from trial for more than three days in a row without defense 
counsels consent once the trial has begun, no matter the reason.11 
Some chambers have obtained counsels consent to treat a regular 
trial day as a deposition when one of those members of the panel is 
absent for reasons other than sickness or emergency. The 
deposition is then put in the trial record, but basically is viewed as 
a regular part of the trial transcript. But this is done rarely. The point 
is that it seems unrealistic to expect three judgessome of reasonably 
advanced ageto sit up to seven hours a day, five days a week for 
months or years on end or that they will never be ill or that their 
urgent personal matters will occur on the same days. Counsel bent on 
delay can object to continuing the trial in front of less than three 
judges. An entire trial may need to be cancelled if one judge has a 
 
 9.  GLENDON ET AL., supra note 7, at 179-83. 
 10.  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T (Mar. 3, 2000) (trial from June 
24, 1997 until July 30, 1999, with judgment rendered on March 3, 2000); Prosecutor v. 
Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T (Jan. 14, 2000) (trial from August 17, 1998, to November 11, 
1999, with judgment rendered on January 14, 2000). 
 11.  ICTY R.P. & EVID. 15 bis. 
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lengthy illness. I must say that the practice of three judges sitting 
together in trial for months at a time seems to me a dubious use of 
scarce resources, although I appreciate that trial before a single judge 
from one country might provoke criticism that the court represents 
the voice of that one country. Still, either shorter trials or more 
flexible rules for occasional absences, such as no more than five days 
in any trial for any reason, seem sensible especially for the 
nonpresiding judges whose functions are often confined to listening, 
asking a few questions, and consulting on procedural rulings. 
Lack of fluency in both English and Frenchthe two working 
languages of the Tribunaland to an extent in the native language of 
the defendants and witnesses has turned out to be a greater obstacle 
than I would have anticipated. In court, a bank of simulcast 
translators and simulcast video screens allow a trial to proceed 
relatively smoothly even though the defendants and their counsel 
speak Serbo-Croatian and the prosecutors and the judges speak 
French or English. I am assigned to a Chamber where the other 
judges are more at home in French as a second language than English 
(Portuguese and Arabic are their native languages). I am not fluent in 
French. There is no question that the lack of a common language 
makes out-of-court communication less spontaneous and 
memorializing the proceedings more difficult. All internal 
memoranda as well as external documents must be drafted in both 
English and French. The resources available for so much translation 
at the ICTY are not adequate. A document sent to the official 
translation unit in the Registry may take weeks to get back. Hence we 
try to utilize the talents of legal assistants to translate back and forth 
inside the Chambers. In my Chamber during the past year only my 
legal assistant and I wrote fluently in English. As a result, she and I 
bore a disproportionate burden in translating French documents into 
readable English. Chambers in which a majority of the judges have 
fluency in only one of the two working languages realistically need a 
full-time translator. More fundamentally, the notion of two working 
languages in any one court or Chamber may need to be rethought; it 
engenders immense delays. In some cases judgments have not been 
rendered in the second language for months after issuance in the first, 
thereby causing delays in the time for filing appeals because a lawyer 
who speaks English cannot be expected to appeal a judgement 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol5/iss1/9
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available only in French. If for political reasons the two-language 
rule is adhered to, sufficient translators ought to be furnished to make 
the two-operating-languages rule a reality. If Chamber translators are 
not available, then judges and legal assistants might either be 
required themselves to be fluent in both languages, though that would 
significantly cut down the talent pool. Right now the language barrier 
causes substantial delays and requires enormous resources. 
The UN is legendary for its frequently impenetrable bureaucracy. 
In the United States, courts have battled the specter of judicial 
bureaucracy in the form of masters, adjuncts, and magistrates and 
have stoutly defended themselves against charges that their law 
clerks carry too much responsibility for preparing opinions. Because 
ICTY trials are long and fact-specific and because legal assistants are 
often assigned to the Chambers as a whole, with only one junior legal 
assistant assigned to any individual judge, the task of initially 
drafting the Chambers judgments, to a very considerable degree, is 
not infrequently delegated to the pool of legal assistants who 
commonly are selected by the Presiding Judge or the senior legal 
officers. Reading some of the several-hundred-pages-long, format-
stylized judgments of the ICTY, one can guess that many of the 
judgments are the work of a committee rather than an individual 
judge or judges. Indeed sometimes judgments are parceled out to 
different judges, sometimes the staff assistants prepare first drafts 
with guidance from the judges who then review, revise, and approve 
the judgment. But my experience has been that ICTY judgments are 
not usually the individualized one-on-one opinions of a federal trial 
or appellate judge in the United States. I admit I much prefer the 
latter, though I recognize the imperative for division of responsibility 
in large-scale productions. I have never belonged to the A judge 
must write every word herself school, but I have recognized the risk 
of losing control of the process if the judge does not define the issues, 
work out the reasoning and responsibility in advance with law clerks, 
and meticulously analyze, revise and edit any draft presented to her. 
That close monitoring task becomes monumental, however, when 
parts of the judgment are produced in one language not spoken or 
understood by all three judges and by legal assistants who do not 
belong to individual judges but rather to the Chambers as a whole, 
reporting primarily to the President of the Chambers or to the senior 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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legal assistant whom he selects. I also have the impression that the 
purpose of a judgement may vary within legal cultures. In my U.S. 
experience the emphasis is on telling the parties and the public why 
the judges came to a particular result in light of relevant facts and 
law. In the culture of some of my new colleagues, the format appears 
to be more ritualistic, requiring a formal recitation of what the parties 
argued; what the abstract legal theory is; what the factual findings of 
the court are; and then, finally and not always predictably, the 
ultimate result. There seems to be less premium on making 
transparent the judges reasoning as to how the law applies to the 
facts, except where dissenting or concurring judges file separate 
statements. In my opinion, there is less emphasis on style and 
readability. The author of the judgement itself is not identified 
(though I find the cognoscenti around the Tribunal make informed 
guesses); it is signed either by the presiding judge or all three judges. 
For these reasons ICTY judgments sometimes seem stilted, 
bureaucratic, and insufficiently reasoned, making them largely 
inaccessible to the reader and frustrating to the press and even legal 
scholars who try to analyze them. If I could, I would opt for legal 
assistants assigned to individual judges and for giving the judges 
specific responsibility for drafting the entire or at least significant 
parts of the judgement, which could be profitably much shorter than 
they are now. 
These comments lead inexorably to thoughts about the selection 
of judges for an international court. At the ICTY the sixteen judges 
are elected for four-year terms by the General Assembly of the UN, 
based on the nomination of member countries.12 The ICTY Statute 
says only that candidates must be qualified to serve on the highest 
judicial level in their own countries. The new ICC law is somewhat 
more specific, requiring a proportioned mix of judges expert in 
criminal procedure and international law.13 Judges come to the 
Tribunal at all ages (a few in fragile health) and with widely different 
careers as politicians, scholars, diplomats, and practicing lawyers or 
 
 12.  ICTY STAT., supra note 1, arts. 12-13. 
 13. ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT art. 36, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 183/9th, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm (last visited Mar. 
25, 2001). 
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judges. They are assigned to trial or appeals work by the President of 
the Tribunal, largely based on vacancies rather than fit. Thus we have 
judges with no criminal law background sitting on massive trials and 
judges with no appellate experience sitting in the Appeals Chamber, 
which in turn reviews the decisions of experienced trial judges. This 
happens to a degree in all court systems, including the United States, 
but in federal trial courts actual trial practice is generally a 
prerequisite to the job. On-the-job learning is fairly expensive in 
complex, prolonged trials in which the judge must make hundreds of 
procedural rulings. In the early years of the ICTY, political leaders 
may not have been sufficiently aware of the critical role that the 
Tribunal would play in the development of international humanitarian 
law or as a precursor to a permanent international criminal court. 
They may not have focused on the perception as well as the reality 
that a fair trial by capable judges is indispensable to the Tribunals 
reputation as a legitimate vehicle of international accountability. It is 
to be hoped that country nominating authorities will become more 
sensitive to the necessary talents an ICTY judge needs. Admittedly, 
the Tribunal has had some stars and some quick learners, but a keener 
sense of the day-to-day functions of the judges and the mission of the 
Tribunal by national leaders is needed for more qualified 
appointments and more effective work of the Tribunal. 
III. THE ACCUSED 
Ninety-nine persons, including one woman, have been indicted 
publicly for war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide. Sixty-
six people have been publicly indicted and are currently facing 
charges (in some cases, charges were dropped or the accused died), 
six have been completed, twelve are on appeals, ten are currently in 
trial, and fourteen are awaiting trial.14 The accused vary greatly in 
their alleged culpability; big fish and small fish swim side-by-side. 
Although two of the three whalesMilosevic, Karadzic, and Mladic
remain at large and the third is on trial for domestic crimes, several of 
their key military and civilian deputies as well as one-time members 
 
 14. See ICTY, ICTY Key Figures, at http://www.un.org/icty/glance.keyfig-e.htm (last 
visited March 29, 2001).  
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of the Bosnian-Serb Presidency are in detention at the Hague. They 
are accused of conducting years-long shelling and sniper attacks in 
Sarajevo and of planning and executing the massacre at Srebrenica of 
5,000 young Bosnian men, just months before the Dayton Accord 
was signed. They are charged with commanding prison camps 
through which thousands of civilians were herded and brutally 
abused.15 But it must be recognized that there are also less 
consequential legacies from the early years of the Tribunal: prison 
guards and opportunistic bullies accused of committing atrocities 
who would probably not be considered priority defendants today. 
This must contrasted with Nuremberg and Tokyo where the war was 
over and the vast majority of the defendants were already in allied 
hands before trials began. 
The ICTY accused include some petty criminal types with records 
of delinquency and local crimes to whom war provided a sensational 
outlet for sociopathic tendencies. But ironically most of the accused 
do not fall into that categorythey had no prior criminal record, many 
were policemen, politicians, or professional soldiers who still view 
themselves as patriots, and family men with citations for past services 
to their communities. One defendant is himself the son of an 
Auschwitz survivor. Many have served abroad in Western capitals, 
and some have even negotiated with Western diplomats. While some 
are accused of hands-on atrocities, brutal beatings, murders, and 
rapes, the most serious offenders are more akin to the Nuremberg 
High Command defendants. They are the senior officials who 
allegedly drew up the plans, strategies, and campaigns to achieve the 
vicious ends they had come to believe were legitimate state activities. 
Some appear depressed in the courtroom as they listen to the horrors 
attributed to them. Others appear arrogant, staring down witnesses on 
the stand, grimacing, and passing streams of notes to their counsel 
during trial. Others giggle during testimony on rape and sexual 
slavery. Some have surrendered voluntarily, proclaiming their 
innocence and their confidence that the Tribunal will exonerate them. 
Several were acquitted of all or some of the charges.16 Some 
 
 15.  Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-I (Indictment, Mar. 26, 1999); Prosecutor v. 
Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-I (Indictment, Mar. 21, 2000). 
 16.  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-85-16-T (Jan. 14, 2000); Prosecutor 
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complain of physical after-effects from the violent apprehensions 
they underwent, including broken arms or ribs, at the hands of SFOR 
peacekeepers or foreign police. Others have fought extradition for 
months or years from their countries of residence. 
The Detention Unit in Scheveningen, the North Sea Port on the 
outskirts of The Hague where they are held, is quite upscale, certainly 
in comparison to some American prisons I have viewed. Each 
accused has his own cell with toilet and shower and an outlet for a 
computer. The day rooms are clean and equipped with television and 
games. There is an exercise room, a medical facility with a full-time 
nurse and visiting doctors, outdoor recreation, and several training 
and craft classeseven provision for conjugal visits. Under Tribunal 
rules the accused is asked regularly in open court if he has any 
complaints about detention. Few register any of consequence; the 
inability to get Serbian channels on television is the most common. A 
press comment attributed to Mrs. Milosevic that the Detention Unit is 
a death camp is ludicrous. There have, however, been two deaths in 
detention. One died from a heart attack. The other committed suicide. 
The facility does conduct suicide watches and prevents some 
defendants from having contact with certain others where there may 
be danger of physical harm or undue influence, and it also monitors 
phone calls. 
The pretrial detention periods are longan average of over two 
years now that apprehensions have so dramatically increased.17 If the 
Tribunal had not received an infusion of ad litem judges (judges 
designated for a particular trial) from the UN, a defendant arrested 
today would not have been tried before 2002.18 Most of the 
defendants have families about whom they obviously care. The 
restrained and dignified appearance of some in court day after day, 
 
v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T (Nov. 16, 1998). 
 17.  See ICTY, Detainees and Former Detainees, at http://www.un.org/icty/glance.htm 
(last visited Oct. 2000) (examples include Tadic (arrested February 12, 1994, trial commenced 
May 7, 1996); Cerkez (arrested October 6, 1996, trial commenced April 12, 1999); Krnojelac 
(arrested June 15, 1998, still in pre-trial); and Kunarac (arrested March 4, 1998 trial 
commenced March 20, 2000)).   
 18.  Status of Ongoing Cases in the ICTY Trial Chamber, April, 2000 (on file with author) 
(without additional resources, none of the three Trial Chambers would be available before 
2002).    
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month after month cannot but raise anew unanswerable questions 
about the metamorphosis of the human personality in time of war 
from caring family and community member to vicious abuser or 
executioner. In ICTY prosecutions, this is especially perplexing. The 
war crimes were often committed against neighbors, most frequently 
Muslims, but Croates and Serbs as well, or people with whom the 
accused had worked, recreated, lived, and even inter-married. A vital 
component of almost every Bosnian-Serb defense is that the accused 
lived for most of his life amiably with his Muslim neighbors and 
coworkers and that he helped Muslim friends during the war at the 
same time he is accused of killing or beating other Muslims. The 
most common defense, harking back to Nuremberg, is not that the 
awful things that the victim-witnesses testify to did not happen or that 
they were not terrible and wicked deeds, but that the accused was not 
responsible because either he was not there at all or he did not know 
about the atrocities committed by subordinates or superiors. He was, 
it is contended, merely the wrong man at the wrong place at the 
wrong time. Because the paper trail in many of these cases is sparse 
and episodic as contrasted to the meticulously maintained archives 
the Allies had at their disposal in Nuremberg, the defense sometimes 
works.  
Under the ICTY Statute the accused may, but is not compelled to, 
take the stand.19 Indeed, even if he chooses not to testify, he can 
make an unsworn statement not subject to cross-examination at the 
beginning of the trial.20 He also can testify formally under oath at the 
beginning of the trial before the prosecution puts on its case. 
Surprisingly, two defendants in the Omarska prison camp trial did so, 
presumably to acquaint the court from the start with their own 
version of what their involvement was. This is apparently common 
practice in the courts of the Former Yugoslavia. An accused in a 
different case gave a videotaped pretrial interview to the prosecution 
with full knowledge that the prosecution could make it part of its 
case-in-chief. There are no trials in absentia, so the accused faces his 
accusers day after day for months at a time. In the courtroom he has 
his own television monitor and simulcast translation in his native 
 
 19. ICTY STAT., supra note 1, art. 21(g). 
 20. ICTY R.P.  & EVID. 84 bis. 
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language of all testimony. Should he become unruly he can be 
removed, but to my knowledge this has never happened.21 Witnesses 
typically are called up to identify him in court, though in some cases 
this seemingly surefire technique has misfired on the prosecution. 
Some of these witnesses have not seen the defendants for nearly a 
decade, and then under the traumatic circumstances of a prison camp 
or on the execution field and they do not recognize them in court.  
The verdict of the court is announced simultaneously with the 
sentence, which ranges up to life imprisonment.22 The longest 
sentence imposed so far is forty-five years.23 Sentences are served in 
the prison systems of neutral countries with whom the Tribunal has 
negotiated agreements. Pardons or commutations can be implemented 
only by the Tribunal. Appeals can be taken from the sentence as well 
as the verdict, and the prosecution can appeal an acquittal or the 
length of a sentence.24 New evidence may be admitted on appeal if it 
is in the interests of justice.25 The whole process from apprehension 
or surrender to judgement on appeal (assuming no remand) takes on 
average three to four years. People debate the deterrent effect of the 
Tribunal on future war crimes when pitted against the terrible and 
immediate pressures of rampant nationalism and war. However, I 
think that anyone exposed to a year or longer trial in the Hague, 
televised throughout the Balkans and Europe, must come to believe it 
will have some effect, at least on intelligent, professional military or 
civilian leaders even if not on monomaniacal tyrants, and perhaps on 
those who might otherwise be the opportunistic rogue players. No 
defendant I have seen in the dock looks like he ever remotely 
expected to be there, and had there been a stronger prior precedent of 
war crimes Tribunals, some might have been deterred. 
IV. THE PROSECUTOR 
The Prosecutor is the chief policy maker and political lightning 
rod of the Tribunal. She determines which indictments to bring and 
 
 21. ICTY R.P. & EVID. 80(B). 
 22. ICTY R.P. & EVID. 98 ter. 
 23. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T (Mar. 3, 2000).  
 24. ICTY R.P. & EVID. 108. 
 25. ICTY R.P. & EVID. 115. 
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how vigorously to pursue them by exerting pressure on SFOR or 
foreign governments to make arrests. She exercises her power 
completely independentlyan issue of some controversy to the 
United States insofar as the new International Criminal Court is 
concerned. Thus she couldand indeed was asked to and did
determine whether to open an investigation which could lead to 
bringing an indictment against NATO decisionmakers in the bombing 
of Belgradeshe found no cause to do so.26 She has also been urged, 
but declined, to investigate UN and Dutch officials for allegedly 
contributing to the Srebrenica massacres by their inaction. She has 
the greatest resources of any branch of the Tribunal with 182 
budgeted posts in the investigators division27 alone. Although her 
indictments must be confirmed by a judge of the Tribunal who 
decides if the supporting material she provides makes out reasonable 
grounds for believing that a subject has committed a crime,28 there is 
no other check on her choice of whom to indict, whether to do it 
publicly or secretly, which ones or how many charges to bring, what 
evidence to offer, and whether to seek protective measures for 
witnesses. She even can appeal an acquittal or a sentence she 
considers too lenient. She is the Prosecutor of the Rwanda Tribunal 
as well as the ICTY. 
The multinational ICTY prosecution staff, in my limited 
experience, is able, dedicated, and professional. If I were to question 
anything, it would be the apparent view of each prosecution task 
force that it should have the full resources of the Tribunal available 
for its case, with proliferating witnesses lists of 100 or more, despite 
lengthening backlogs of other cases and the Prosecutors own oft-
repeated admonitions that the court act more speedily. Based on U.S. 
experience, I think the prosecution could make many of its cases with 
far fewer witnesses and fewer counts in their indictments. For a time 
the Tribunal and the Prosecutor engaged in a debate over what, if 
any, limits on cumulative charging there should be. Some judges felt 
 
 26. Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor (June 13, 2000) (on file with author) (stating 
that there is no basis for opening an investigation into incidents related to the NATO air 
campaign).  
 27.  Expert Group Report, supra note 3, at 48. 
 28.  ICTY R.P. & EVID. 47. 
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a plethora of charges prolongs trials unnecessarily, while the 
Prosecution said it poses no problems of multiplication of proof and 
the fact that a number of charges are based on the same incidents can 
be considered at sentencing. The debate was settled by an Appeals 
Chamber decision allowing simulated charging and setting out a 
liberal criteria for cumulative convictions as well.29 Since many 
indictments are the result of years of difficult field investigationsat 
least 5 years in the case of the Srebrenica trialit is understandable 
that the Prosecutors want their fullest case spread on the record. 
However, consistent with the doctrine of speedy trial I do not think 
the Tribunal can accommodate the rising backlog of cases unless the 
current length of trials is curtailed somehow. Some judges at the 
ICTY, perhaps reflecting more their civil law indoctrination, seem 
reluctant to direct counsel to drop charges or limit duplicative 
witnesses. The Prosecutor also argues consistently for the broadest 
leeway in introducing evidence, including in some cases prior witness 
statements that its investigators have taken in the field, even where 
cross-examination is not possible. I hasten to say, however, that the 
prosecution presentations are sophisticated. Expert witnesses are used 
widely with enormously detailed backup reports on mass grave 
exhumations, military command structure in the Bosnian-Serb army, 
and communications intercepts. I found most astounding in the 
Srebrenica case the satellite aerial image photography furnished by 
the U.S. military intelligence which pinpointed to the minute 
movements on the ground of men and transports in remote Eastern 
Bosnian locations. These photographs not only assisted the 
prosecution in locating the mass grave sites over hundreds of miles of 
terrain, they were also introduced to validate its witnesses accounts 
of where thousands of civilians were detained and eventually killed. 
Withal, it is the Prosecutor who decides how to use her vast 
resources, whether to go after low-level perpetrators as well as the 
big fish. In the beginning, as I noted earlier, when all major figures 
were beyond reach, it was understandable that charges would be 
brought against lesser miscreants. Unfortunately the trial of those 
cases, unless materially disciplined, makes the likelihood of bringing 
 
 29. Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-A (Feb. 20, 2001),  ¶¶ 389-425. 
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the leaders reasonably promptly to trialif they are caughtmore 
difficult. Marginal indictments and heavy use of cumulative charging 
can clog the pipeline. A recent arrest was made of a single camp 
commander charged with eighty counts; some might think it a case of 
overkill.30 More efforts might be made to send some of the smaller 
cases to be tried in national courts, where that is a realistic possibility. 
Right now the Prosecutor does not engage openly in plea bargaining
a concept unique but indispensable to the American criminal law 
system. Nor does she, as a general rule, grant immunity in exchange 
for testimony, although a few exceptions can be spotted in the 
records. While it is asserted that these techniques have been 
employed too liberally in the U.S. system, there is a compelling need 
for some careful, constructive use of them to cut down the 
burgeoning ICTY backlog. As of March, 2001 thirty-seven of sixty-
six public indictees were in detention; three were on provisional 
release; twenty-four were in trial or pre-trial in twelve cases (four 
trials, eight pre-trials); four were awaiting sentences; eighteen had 
been tried, and twelve were on appeal.31 There are also thirty-six 
ongoing investigations in Kosovo with a potential for up to 150 new 
defendants.32 The Prosecutor predicted that the Tribunal would need 
ten years or more to do its work, not counting appeal times. With new 
outbreaks of civil and international disorder occurring all over the 
globe and new demands for war crimes tribunals in Sierra Leone, 
Cambodia, and East Timor, it just may not be realistic to expect the 
UN to concentrate its efforts so heavily in a Tribunal that, along with 
the Rwandan Tribunal, will account for 10% of the UNs annual 
budget for another decade.33 
V. THE DEFENSE COUNSEL 
A vigorous, unintimidated, knowledgeable defense is the sine qua 
non of a fair trial. In ICTY trials, the obstacles, including lack of 
access to witnesses and evidence, logistical difficulties in meeting 
 
 30.  Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-95-2-I (Indictment, Feb. 12, 1999). 
 31. ICTY, Fact Sheet on ICTY Proceedings, at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/procfact-
e.htm (last visited March, 2000). 
 32. ICTY Weekly Press Briefing ( Feb. 9, 2000) (on file with author).  
 33. Id.  
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with clients, risks of homegrown intimidation, and strange new 
hybrid procedures make the defense counsels job especially fraught 
with problems. 
Both the ICTY Statute and the European Convention on Human 
Rights give an accused the right to counsel of his own choosing, or 
alternatively the right to defend himself. If he is without means, he is 
given counsel free of charge.34 Counsel is qualified under ICTY 
Tribunal Rules if fluent in one of the Tribunals languages and an 
established member of the bar of his home country or a law 
professor.35 In Rwanda, defense counsel must have ten years of 
relevant experience. Most accused get a defense team which 
includes two or more lawyers and an investigator. They come and 
goexpenses paid by the Tribunalto the Hague from their home 
bases. The accused also has the right to an interpreter if he doesnt 
speak either of the two working languages of the court, French and 
English. 
In all but four cases, the indictees have pled indigence and the 
Tribunal pays for their counsel at rates reputed to be often much more 
generous than those prevailing in their home countries. This creates, 
according to some, strong incentive for counsel to prolong the 
proceedings. The investigation into whether an accused in fact is 
indigent is difficult. The Registry of the Tribunal to whom this task is 
committed must inquire into the assets and income of the defendant 
in countries like Croatia and Republika Srpska whose authorities, 
whether from hostility or ennuino one is quite sure, do not always 
reply to inquiries. The Tribunal places a high priority on moving 
ahead expeditiously to trial, so if a defendant and his counsel are 
persistent enough the Tribunal will pay.  
Logistics cause continuing problems for the defense. Counsel 
often complain they do not get the myriad of pretrial disclosures and 
motions served upon them in reasonable time to prepare for hearings. 
In some cases, due to translation overload, the clients rights under 
the Rules to translations of critical documents in their native Serbo-
Croatian language are not honored promptly. Moreover, there are 
obvious obstacles to regular communication between client and 
 
 34. ICTY Stat., supra note 1, art. 21. 
 35. ICTY R.P. & EVID. 44, 45. 
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counsel. Clients in detention in the War Crimes Detention Unit in 
Scheveningen are inaccessible to out-of-country counsel much of the 
time. 
But some commentators say there are even more profound 
problems with defense counsel, involving issues of competence, 
integrity, and accessibility to the evidence and witnesses they need in 
order to play on a level field with the prosecution. 
The Tribunal often operates under different rules from those of the 
national court system. The Rules originally tilted toward our Anglo-
American adversarial trial system, though that is changing, 
perceptibly. The burden of proof is on the prosecution to show guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and there used to be, but no longer is, a 
stated preference for live witnesses rather than paper dossiers, and the 
accused has a right to cross-examine witnesses against him, to have 
adequate time and facilities to prepare his defense, and to obtain the 
attendance of witnesses on his own behalf. There are, however, 
distinct elements of the continental system woven throughout: 
indictments are confirmed by a judge and not a grand jury; the 
accused may make an unsworn statement not subject to cross-
examination; hearsay bars do not generally apply; there is no jury and 
two out of three judges can decide whether the reasonable doubt 
standard has been met; the prosecution may appeal from an acquittal; 
and the judges may not only ask questions at trial but can call for 
additional evidence or witnesses of their own. 
Understandably, the bulk of defense counsel are Balkan-trained 
lawyers and are typically not experienced at cross-examination. Some 
are quick learners, but others are painfully awkward and unfocused 
on just what they are trying to accomplish. They sometimes argue 
with or even criticize the witnesses. They also go off on tangents that 
are not always relevant to their case. The Tribunal is now operating 
training courses for appointed lawyers, but, candidly, it is not easy to 
acculturate lawyers in a wholly new legal system in a few days of 
lectures or even simulated exercises. As an American judge, I frankly 
find many ICTY defense cross-examinations painfully unhelpful to 
my own judgement. I have noticed how often the witnesses seem to 
resent the cross-examinations and pull back into a litany of dont 
remembers. They see the defense counsel allied with their nemeses 
in the docks. Several witnesses have at the end of their testimony 
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addressed concluding remarks to the defense counsel rather than the 
accused: How can you stand there and defend these men who have 
taken everything away from us, our families, our health, our 
homeland? In sum, I came away from the two lengthy trials in 
which I have participated thinking that the potential of cross-
examination by defense counsel in the search for truth has not been 
realized. 
Defense counsel complain bitterlynot without basisthat they do 
not have the equality of arms supposedly guaranteed by the ICTY 
Statute and the European Convention on Human Rights.36 For 
reasons not difficult to discern, prospective defense witnesses often 
refuse to come to the Hague from Bosnia or Republika Srpska, and in 
most cases cannot realistically be subpoenaed or forced to do so. 
Governments of former belligerents may refuse to give up evidence 
to defense counsel which could help the particular defendants, but 
perhaps embarrass or implicate persons of power or influence in 
those countries. Defense counsel may ask the Tribunal to assist them 
in making formal requests to recalcitrant countries and witnesses, but 
there is no real enforceability of such requests except to report the 
malfeasors to the UN Security Council. Recent changes of 
government in Balkan countries such as Croatia and Serbia have 
increased cooperation with the Tribunal,37 but in the end defense 
counsel are left to scramble on their own in the quest for witnesses 
and evidence. 
Finally, the role of defense counsel as the bridge between his 
client and the outside world is often a treacherous one in the 
politically volatile climate of the Balkans. Just as in other 
professions, there are bad apples among the good,38 but in a national 
 
 36. Defense counsel argued unsuccessfully in the Tadic case that this inequality in access 
to informationthe Prosecution has hundreds of investigators, more clout with hostile 
governments, and several years lead time in which to prepare its caseviolates a defendants 
right to adequate defense. The Appeals Chamber, however, dismissed the argument.  Prosecutor 
v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-A (July 15, 1999). 
 37. See, e.g., Interview of President Mesic, CROATIAN MEDIA SUMMARY (Sept. 25, 2000) 
 (on file with author) ([T]he names are known, the perpetrators and commanders are known 
and they must end up in court. There is no statute of limitations on war crimes.); see also 
ICTY, SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ICTY 3, 32 (2000) (noting significant upturn in 
[cooperation] in the Republic of Croatia) (on file with author). 
 38. The UN is currently investigating newspaper reports that in some cases defense 
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court system there is usually an agreed upon norm for lawyers 
behavior, undergirded by law school training and bar codes of 
conduct and disciplinary proceedings. In an international court, 
lawyers come from different legal cultures. As occasional players, 
their loyalties to the ICTY may be less strong than to their local court 
systems or to their clients. Pressures to improvise evidence or even 
on some occasions to intimidate witnesses may be intense. As a 
result, there have been instances of defense counsel implication in 
witness obstruction. The Tribunal has a Code of Conduct for 
attorneys appearing before it and the Registry has powers to censure 
or disqualify incompetent or corrupt counsel.39 Trial Chambers also 
have held contempt hearings based on the behavior of some 
counsel.40 Still, the endemic problems defense counsel face defending 
hometown heroes, whose hometowns reject the legitimacy of the 
Tribunal, are formidable. Sometimes the accused themselves thwart 
the process. Frustrated day after day with watching legal arguments 
that they do not really understand and anxious to assert themselves in 
the face of piteous tales of victim-witnesses, they resort to firing 
their counsel in open court, giving the counsel counterproductive 
instructions, or insisting on telling their stories at strategically 
inopportune times. 
Occasionally the defense counsel or their families may even find 
themselves at physical risk if they are perceived by hostile political 
forces at home to be mounting a defense that may implicate powerful 
personages. Though the so-called Nuremberg defense of following 
orders is inapplicable as a defense to ICTY war crimes 
prosecutions,41 it may still be relevant to mitigation of punishment,42 
and, in certain cases, location of the responsibility for initiating 
certain actions elsewhere may exonerate a defendant altogether. But 
 
counsel are inveighed by their clients to pay back a percentage of their fees as a condition of 
their selection or to make substantial gifts to them.  See The Tribunal’s Money leaks out to the 
Accused, NRC HANDELSBLAD, July 1, 2000, at 1. 
 39. ICTY R.P. & EVID. 46. 
 40. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77 (Judgment on Allegations of Contempt 
Against Prior Counsel, Jan. 31, 2000); Prosecutor v. Aleksoviski, Case No. IT-95-14/1 
(Decision on Contempt of Tribunal, Dec. 11, 1998). 
 41. ICTY STAT., supra note 1, art. 7. 
 42. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A (Oct. 7, 1997). 
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it may also increase the personal risks that counsel run. 
VI. THE WITNESSES 
Victim-witnesses are the soul of war crimes trials at the ICTY. 
This was not true of earlier war crimes trials. In the Nuremberg 
prosecutions, the Nazi High Command and bureaucracy left behind a 
vast paper trail that made witness testimony less important. 
Moreover, as unconditional victor, the Allies had ready access to 
those troves of documentation. The architects of ethnic cleansing in 
the Balkans were not so systematic or paper-bound. Many of their 
most notorious actions were decided on the spot or were transmitted 
orally or telephonically, usually encrypted on a closed circuit. As 
critically, because the conflicts that split the former Yugoslavia were 
settled by diplomatic accords that brokered the territorial boundaries 
of the combatants, tribunal prosecutors do not have guaranteed access 
to those relevant documents that do exist but are still in the hands of 
former belligerents. They must often negotiate to obtain them
frequently unsuccessfullywith not-so-friendly governments. 
The hundreds of witnesses come not only from the Balkans, but 
from Western Europe, Australia, and other distant places where they 
have emigrated or resettled as refugees. It is, in critical part, on their 
testimony that the ICTY judges must make their judgments as to the 
responsibility of the accused for grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide. For example, in the prison camps 
(euphemistically labeled collection centers by their creators) 
established all across Bosnia in 1992 to hold Muslims or Croats 
expelled from their villages in Serb takeovers (or, indeed, camps 
sometimes set up by the Muslims to hold captured Serbs), lists of the 
thousands of detainees usually do not exist. There are often not even 
records of the chain of command in these centers. As a result, in trials 
of guards and lower level officers, such as the Omarska and Keraterm 
camps cases on which I am sitting now, the principal issue is 
identifying who made the decisions. The accuseds assertions are 
invariably that they were only foot soldiers or sometimes that they 
were not even in the camps. A parade of victim-witnesses must be 
mobilized by the Prosecution to refute these defenses. Even in the 
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most monstrous war crimes involving executions and massacres of 
thousands there may be no evidence of written orders to execute, 
bury, or rebury the victims, nor sure identification of the senior 
commanders who actively planned, approved, or ordered the 
slaughter.43 The only documents in these trials may consist of coded 
excerpts from Bosnian-Serbian intercepted phone calls, often subject 
to varying interpretations. The prosecution must rely on a 
combination of the personal testimony of victim-witnesses who 
survived the killing fields and expert testimony that pieces victim-
witness testimony together into a coherent story. 
Since 1996 nearly 1000 victim-witnesses have been brought to the 
Hague to give testimony.44 It is not possible to recount in any 
shorthand way their stories: the physical or emotional horrors they 
lived through; the ruination of their lives, families, and communities; 
and the residues of hate, hopelessness and despair. Most of the 
witnesses were severely traumatized. Some avoided execution by 
playing dead for hours under piles of corpses. Some saw three 
generations of men in their families killed within a weeks time. 
Many were tortured or themselves forced to abuse or to beat fellow 
prisoners. Women including twelve and thirteen year-old girls, 
underwent torture in the form of indiscriminate gang rapes and 
prolonged sexual enslavement. 
My focus here is on the difficulties encounteredprimarily by the 
prosecutionin transforming these terrible experiences into 
admissible evidence against war crimes defendants. The obstacles are 
formidable. First there is the problem of getting victim witnesses to 
testify at all. The Tribunal has no enforceable subpoena power over 
residents of independent states. If the witness does not want to come 
and the state where she lives will not compel her to, the Tribunal can 
do nothing.45 
Many witnesses still reside in the areas where the war crimes took 
place and their fear of intimidation and retaliation by friends, family, 
 
 43. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T (Indictment, Nov. 2, 1998).   
 44. Remarks of Judge Richard May, ICTY, to Preparatory Commission for the 
International Criminal Court (Mar. 20, 2000) (on file with author).  
 45. Some friendly countries have adopted domestic legislation requiring citizens who 
receive a Tribunal summons to honor it in the same manner as if it came from a national court 
but less friendly countries where the bulk of the witnesses live often do not have such laws. 
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or allies of the defendants is often real. Threats to their safety are not 
infrequent, some are blatantly public, and some are anonymous. Even 
families of accused persons in detention may be threatened if higher-
ups still at large fear that the accuseds testimony will implicate them 
before the Tribunal. As a result, a large percentage of witnesses in 
ICTY trials ask for and get some type of protection ranging from: (1) 
non-disclosure of their identity to the media or in the public record; 
(2) court orders to defense counsel to keep a log and notify the 
prosecutor of all contacts with witnesses; (3) facial and voice 
distortion of the witness on camera since the proceedings are 
televised to the Balkans; and (4) in extreme cases taking testimony in 
closed session which will not appear in the public transcripts. 
Even with these protective measures, the tension in the courtroom 
is palpable. Many of the witnesses are physically and emotionally 
fragilein the aftermath of their fractured lives. They frequently break 
down on the stand. The accused are there in the courtroom only a few 
feet away. One witness openly pled with the court to stop the accused 
from threatening her with his eyes. At other times, watching and 
listening, it seems to me that the witness grows impatient with the 
trial process. He has recounted his story of beatings, torture, and 
killings and then he must submit to being cross-examined on minute 
details like what kind of uniform the accused was wearing at the time 
or where he stood or what his facial expression was. Some of the 
witnesses say they are relieved to testify before us. Some express a 
humbling confidence that we will bring justice to their suffering. 
Others seem to find their courtroom experience with its stress on 
legal subtleties anti-climatic and frustrating. Prosecutors say that as 
the years go by (it is almost a decade now since the first Bosnian 
conflict began) it is harder and harder to convince witnesses to 
testify. Many are bent on rebuilding their lives, some even in their old 
home communities. The most vulnerable have tried to put the horrors 
behind them. Memories fade; some are downright cynical, watching 
their real oppressors still at large and thriving. 
Yet traditional rights of the accused, such as pretrial release, are 
also implicated. In the early years of the Tribunal, detention 
presented no real problems since there were so few defendants and 
they could be tried promptly. Now the situation is very different. We 
have thirty-five defendants in detention in a Dutch prison on the 
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outskirts of the Hague. Some have languished there for over two 
years.46 The European Convention on Human Rights accords a right 
to trial in a reasonable time or release pending trial, yet the Tribunals 
own Rules initially had an express presumption against release except 
in exceptional conditions, interpreted by the judges to mean 
terminal illness.47 This limitation was rationalized on the basis of the 
extreme gravity of all war crime charges, on the fact that many 
accused had been captured under conditions that put UN 
peacekeepers lives at risk, and the reality that local authorities in the 
accuseds home communities could not be expected to supervise the 
accused properly. In the last year, however, under pressure from the 
growing number of detainees and pursuant to the recommendation of 
a UN Expert Group48 evaluating the Tribunals practices, the ICTY 
changed course. It deleted the exceptional conditions requirement 
and released several defendants back to the Republika Srpska on the 
countrys guarantees that its police would monitor the accused and 
return them for trial.49 The Chamber that granted the release was 
influenced also by the fact that these particular accused had 
voluntarily surrendered, could not yet be brought to trial for more 
than a year, and had already been in detention for two years. The 
Prosecutor strenuously resisted the releases, arguing, not implausibly, 
that the spectacle of indicted war criminals walking freely among 
their alleged victims would chill future witnesses from coming forth 
and intimidate those that had already agreed to do so. Some Tribunal 
pretrial discovery rules are more liberal than U.S. Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, entitling the defendant to all prior statements of 
witnesses the prosecution intends to call. The accused, at the time of 
release, would know not only who the witnesses against him were but 
what they were likely to say, a factor which increases the witnesss 
 
 46. ICTY, Fact Sheet on ICTY Proceedings, at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/glance/ 
procfact-e.htm (last visited Dec. 2000). 
 47. ICTY R.P. & EVID. 65 (as adopted, February 11, 1994); see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Simic, 
et al., Case No. IT-95-9-PT (Decision on Provisional Release of the Accused, Mar. 26, 1998); 
Prosecutor v. Djukic, Case No. IT-96-20-T (Decision Rejecting the Application to Withdraw 
Indictment and Order for Provisional Release, Apr. 24, 1996); see also European Convention 
For the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 5 (3), available at 
http://www.worldpolicy.org/americas/treaties/echr.html (last visited March 29, 2001). 
 48. Expert Group Report, supra note 3, at 96. 
 49. Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9-PT (Apr. 4, 2000) (release of Tadic and Zaric). 
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unease. It is too soon to see if the dire prophecy of the Prosecutor will 
eventuate, but the dilemma does raise legitimate questions about the 
nexus between defendants rights, witness protection, and Tribunal 
resources. If we had the means to try defendants quickly, we should, 
rather than send them back to still-conflict-ridden areas. 
Unfortunately, we do not.  
A further troubling aspect of ICTY trials concerns the use at trial 
of witness statements given years earlier to investigators in the field. 
The ICTYs own Rules conflict as to the admissibility of these 
statements. Until recently when it was amended, one Rule proclaimed 
witnesses shall, in principle, be heard directly by the Chambers,50 
but there have always been numerous exceptions. One exception is 
for depositions taken by a Tribunal hearing officer.51 However, the 
Rules do not, as U.S. Federal rules do, specify the circumstances 
under which such deposition evidence may be offered at trial. The 
practice in some Chambers is to let it in freely, other Chambers are 
restrictive. There is also a highly ambiguous Rule on Judicial Notice 
which applies not just to facts of common knowledge but to 
adjudicated facts or documentary evidence from other proceedings 
at the Tribunal relating to matters at issue in the current 
proceedings.52 The scope of this rule has been the subject of much 
controversy among the judges. The Prosecution urges a very broad 
reading that would admit relevant facts found in one case, into a 
different case, even though the defendants are not the same. Plainly, 
to accept as fact any matter already adjudicated would shorten 
trialsa desirable goalbut it also raises serious questions about 
fairness to the second set of defendants who were not before the 
Court in the first trial. 
Another Rule permits a party to submit affidavits or formal 
statements of corroborating witnesses to a specific fact testified to by 
a live witness if it is in accord with the procedures of the state in 
which they are signed and submitted in advance of the live witness 
testimony. Here, again, some Chambers have read the Rule narrowly, 
 
 50. ICTY R.P. & EVID. 90. 
 51. ICTY R.P. & EVID. 71. 
 52. ICTY R.P. & EVID. 94. 
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and some more broadly.53 
In one trial, the Tribunal admitted the prior unsworn statement of 
a dead person under a broad general rule of the Tribunal allowing a 
Chamber to admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have 
probative valuea truly vast power which could conflict with the 
other more specific rules.54 The Tribunal Appeals Chamber, however, 
reversed the ruling as providing no guarantee of reliability, even 
under that broad residual clause.55 Chambers are fond of pointing out 
that there are no prohibitions in Tribunal jurisprudence against 
hearsay per se, and judges can decide in continental style what weight 
to give it. Though widely criticized, there is abundant precedent in 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials for use of affidavits in 
lieu of live testimony.56 
I must admit that I find the use of prior witness statements as a 
substitute for live testimony troublesome. In my short time at the 
Tribunal I have seen too many instances in which witnesses on the 
stand have changed, reneged, or even repudiated earlier statements 
which though closer in time to the events, had not been tested in any 
way and were unsworn. Often the statement the witness signs for a 
Prosecution investigator in the field is not even in his native 
language. It has been orally translated from English and read to him 
in Serbo-Bosnian-Croat. There is little doubt that it would be 
infinitely more efficient for witnesses merely to affirm prior 
statements than to give their testimony live and be cross-examined on 
it. But the excruciating process of facing ones torturer, reliving 
awful times, and defending ones account on cross-examination may 
sometimes be indispensable to the integrity of the Tribunals final 
product. Certainly, I believe where the testimony is important to a 
critical issue it should be live. 
 
 53. ICTY R.P. & EVID. 94 ter. There are two other rules of almost equal generality: a 
Chamber may reject evidence if its probative value is outweighed by its effect on the fairness of 
the trial, ICTY R.P. & EVID. 89(D), and it may not consider evidence obtained by methods 
which cast doubt on its reliability or would damage the integrity of the proceeding.  ICTY R.P. 
& EVID. 95. 
 54. ICTY R.P. & EVID. 89(C). 
 55. Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-AR73.6 (Decision on Appeal Regarding 
the Admission into Evidence of Seven Affidavits and One Formal Statement, Sept. 18, 2000). 
 56. Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence: 
Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague and Arusha, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL L. 725, 751-52 (1999). 
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A final area of concern to witnesses, particularly in cases of rape, 
is the Tribunals rejection so far of any privilege for records of 
medical or psychological counseling or treatment received by 
witnesses in the wake of their wartime experience. In one Trial 
Chamber all such records are automatically disclosed to the defense 
before trial. This seems paradoxical in view of the special protections 
afforded rape and sexual abuse victims in the Tribunal rule which 
excludes evidence of past sexual conduct rules out the need for 
corroboration of the victims testimony and severely circumscribes 
the occasions on which the defense of consent can be used.57 The 
Tribunal in Furundžija not only compelled the prosecutor to disclose 
the counselling and treatment records of a rape victim witness it 
possessed, but approved a subpoena for other victims records to a 
nongovernmental organization offering such counseling.58 The 
Prosecutor currently is seeking to revisit the question in other cases 
so that becoming a witness does not automatically open for pretrial 
disclosure all prior medical and psychological records. It may require 
amendment to the Rules. Human Rights organizations currently are 
warning Kosovo rape victims of this risk.59 
Because witnesses are so vital to the success of any international 
criminal tribunal, we must be scrupulously protective of their rights, 
as well as the rights of the accused. I hope that the draft rules for the 
forthcoming International Criminal Court will take careful note of 
our experience. 
VII. LESSONS 
A. The Risk of Isolation 
Though I have served only a short time on the Tribunal, there are 
lessons I think that can be fairly drawn from that experience. The 
record of the ICTY importantly contributes to the development of 
humanitarian law and hopefully to the deterrence of future wartime 
 
 57. ICTY R.P. & EVID. 96. 
 58. Prosecutor v. Furendzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T (July 16, 1998) (finding the 
prosecution had breached obligation of disclosure under Rule 68 and reopening trial). 
 59. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, KOSOVO: RAPE AS A WEAPON OF ETHNIC CLEANSING” 
24 (2000), available at http://www.hrw.org/hrw/reports/2000/fry (last visited Mar. 25, 2000). 
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atrocities. But the Tribunal, in many ways, is still in its adolescence. 
As it seeks to fulfil its laudable and ambitious goals, we must 
recognize and correct its flaws and defects. It needs supportive and 
continual surveillance. Moreover, since some of our modus operendi 
are being adopted or adaptedfor better or worsein the procedures of 
the permanent ICC, the Tribunals due diligence is required to 
evaluate how our practices work in practice. 
The importance of scrutiny is increased by the Tribunals 
institutional isolation as an international court. Unlike the U.S. 
federal and state courts and those of most other national systems, the 
ICTY is not a part of any integrated judicial system. There are no 
lower courts to feed it and screen its cases. There are no sister courts, 
except the ICTR, to provide a point of reference or comparison and 
no higher courts to curb its errors. Although other international 
courts, like the International Court of Justice, are similarly isolated 
they do not exercise criminal jurisdiction or forcibly apprehend 
persons and sentence them to prison. There is a sense of humility that 
reversals by a higher court brings to our U.S. judges, which is not 
always appreciated in the rarefied atmosphere of international 
jurisprudence. A court whose awesome mission is to promote 
international justice and which must apply international humanitarian 
law for the first time in a criminal trial setting needs constructive 
oversight by the outside world of its unique powers and varied 
procedures to assure that mission is achieved. 
B. Political Nature of the Court 
While the ICTY is truly revolutionary in its authority to transcend 
national boundaries and try war criminals wherever found, it is in fact 
highly dependent on other institutions cooperation. It needs state 
cooperation or the UN peacekeeping force to physically arrest 
indicted individuals. Cooperation is required to implement any 
provisional release of defendants awaiting trial or to take depositions 
or obtain formal statements from witnesses who cannot come to The 
Hague. States can hinder the work of the Tribunal by discouraging 
witnesses from coming forward or passively failing to enforce ICTY 
summonses, subpoenas, or requests for information.  
The realpolitik, of course, is that in the Balkans the Tribunal is 
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viewed as a very political animal. After the conviction of the Croatian 
General Tihomir Blaskić last year, several thousand citizens 
demonstrated in front of the U.S. embassy in Zagreb.60 Until the 
recent Yugoslav elections, no day passed without diatribes, threats, 
and condemnations against the Tribunal emanating from Belgrade. 
The Prosecutor has been denied entry into some states. Cooperation 
with the Tribunal has been a prime issue in national electoral 
campaigns in Serbia, Croatia and Montenegro.61 It is informative to 
look at the results of a recent survey of the attitudes of thirty-two 
Bosnian judges and prosecutors toward the ICTY and their own 
domestic war crimes trials. The study found that support of the 
concept of accountability for war crimes varied widely among 
Bosnian-Serbs, Muslims, and Croats. But they all lacked a clear 
understanding of the procedures of the Tribunal or the results of its 
work, and complained they had little access to information from or 
about the Tribunal. Many expressed concern about the Tribunals 
lack of contact with in-country professionals, its blend of civil and 
common law procedures, the selectivity of its targets, the length of 
detention and trials, the practice of sealed indictments, and its 
evidentiary rules. Bosnian-Serb and Croat participants particularly 
thought it political. 
Bosnian Muslims considered the Tribunal on the whole fair, but 
Bosnian-Serbs called it a political body that was an instrument of 
Western influence rather than an independent judicial institution, 
and Bosnian-Croats thought it focused unfairly on Croatian suspects. 
Having recently returned from a weeks outreach visit to Croatia, I 
can attest to the reality of this Croatian perception. All groups 
stressed the Tribunals failure to involve any Bosnians in its workings 
or to establish communications with Bosnia through publications or 
visiting speakers. The Tribunal has since begun an Outreach program 
to rectify those problems.62 
 
 60. Press Release, ICTY (Mar. 7, 2000) (several thousand Croatian citizens protest in 
front of the U.S. Embassy against ICTY sentencing of  a Croatian general to 45 years in prison) 
(on file with author).  
 61. Press Release, ICTY (June 21, 2000) (opposition Socialist Party in Montenegro 
announces protest rallies to block a visit of the Chief Prosecutor of Hague Tribunal) (on file 
with author). 
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Sharply contrasting with Nuremberg and Tokyo, which followed 
unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan, is the context in 
which the Tribunal was created and still operates. The Dayton 
Accords that ended the Bosnia war were was a political compromise 
that left many of the perpetrators of war crimes still in power and 
many of the victims homeless and without a country. Srebrenica, the 
site of one of the worst massacres since World War II, is now 
overwhelmingly a Serbian occupied village, and only slowly and 
fearfully are a very few Muslims returning to what was then, before 
1995, a predominantly Muslim town.63 That pattern is repeated all 
over Bosnia. I have been moved by the number of victim-witnesses 
who conclude their testimony about the atrocities they suffered by 
focusing on the injustice of deportation or expulsion from their 
communities, of being made refugees with no way to return to their 
ancestral homes and villages. By what right did those men make me 
a person without a home, without a community, without a country, 
one asked. In that sense, many of the perpetrators of the worst war 
crimes won their war, regardless of the verdicts of the ICTY. 
C. The ICTY as Historian 
While the international law community regards the ICTY 
benignly, the regional Balkan reaction is decidedly mixed. Initially 
the Tribunal was urged to make detailed findings about the social and 
political etiology of events leading up to the atrocities on trial. This, it 
was suggested, would provide an antidote to revisionist history by 
preserving adjudicated accounts of what actually happened in the 
foreplay to the Bosnian conflict. As a result, dozens of pages in ICTY 
judgments focus on the causes and precursors of the 1991 outbreak of 
hostilities.64 However, commentators, citizens, and officers of the 
implicated countries increasingly suggest that the adversarial trial 
process and the findings of judges may not produce the best 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION (2000). 
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Help? 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 90 (Feb. 2000); Paul W. Khan, Speaking Law to Power: Popular 
Sovereignty, Human Rights and the New International Order, 1 CHI. J. INTL LAW 1 (2000). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol5/iss1/9
p 87 Wald.doc  12/20/2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2001] International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia 117 
 
 
approximations of history. Moreover, the adjudication by ICTY of 
who started, prolonged, or ended the war and why in the context of 
criminal proceedings without the states themselves having input is 
basically unfair, or at least does not contribute to future 
reconciliation.  
D. The Specter of State Sovereignty 
Finally, a brief comment on the controversial issue of state 
sovereignty is warranted. The evolution of international human rights 
law in the past century has achieved the gradual triumph of individual 
rights over state sovereignty. Courts like the ICTY are a prime 
example. The source of its authority is a UN resolution, not a 
compact among states. It need not depend on extradition to obtain its 
suspects so long as a UN force can physically capture them. It tries 
suspects in a country to which they have no ties and sentences them 
to prison in other foreign countries. To many internationalists this 
may reflect a triumph, but there are also voices urging caution. 
Certainly none of us would want international courts to adjudicate the 
majority of local crimes committed in our own countries. Our judicial 
systems, with their peculiar rights and remedies, are products and 
reflections of our unique political and cultural notions.65 Jury trials, 
no double jeopardy, and no appeal of an acquittal are just a few of the 
ingredients Americans consider sine qua non in their system. Until 
recently, everyone assumed that supranational justice could apply 
only to crimes or transactions that occurred across national borders or 
that happened in the course of international conflicts. But these 
boundaries already have moved and may change even more in the 
future. Violations of international conventions, treaties, or even 
customary international law that take place in internal or civil wars 
can and are being prosecuted and tried in international tribunals, and 
a rapid growth category called crimes against humanity has pushed 
away from even those fragile bonds. My experience with the inner 
workings of an international court suggests care. With careful self 
and public scrutiny, such courts can responsibly perform important 
adjudication and accountability functions that national courts in the 
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thrall of leaders who are themselves alleged war criminals cannot. 
However, they should be reserved for just such extreme situations. In 
that sense I am happy to see the newer proposed UN tribunals relying 
more on tribunals located closer to the countries involved and 
composed in part, at least, of jurists from these countries.66 
In conclusion, permit me just one orational flight in what I know 
has been a prosaic nuts and bolts account of my time at the Hague. In 
his Ethics for the New Millenium, the Dalai Lama wrote 
The unfortunate truth is that we are conditioned to regard war 
as something exciting and even glamorous . . .. [W]e see 
murder as dreadful, but there is no association of war with 
criminality. What is even worse is the fact that in modern 
warfare the role of those who instigate it is often far removed 
from the conflict on the ground. At the same time its impact on 
non-combatants grows even greater. Those who suffer most in 
todays armed conflicts are the innocentnot only the families 
of those fighting, but in far greater numbers, civilians who 
often do not play a direct role . . .. [M]ore and more, women, 
children, and the elderly are among its prime victims . . ..  
I like to think that the ICTY will be viewed by history as making 
some small contribution to the resolution of that awful enigma. 
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